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I.

INTRODUCTION

The Supreme Court of the United States’ recent decision in ABC,
Inc. v. Aereo, Inc.1 reflects a growing imbalance between the market power
of broadcasters and the government-owned distribution technology they
control to distribute their content.2 Broadcast networks and affiliates, in
legal filings and public comments, have drawn a line in the sand when it
comes to technologies such as Aereo’s, which allow viewers to bypass local
cable systems to receive antenna signals: Had the Supreme Court sided with
Aereo, incumbent broadcasters threatened publicly to migrate their signals to
other Multichannel Video Programming Distributors (“MVPDs”), such as
cable or internet service providers.3 Since nearly eighty-three percent of
Americans receive their digital broadcast signals via cable and satellite
MVPDs, broadcasters have grown to rely on retransmission consent fees
*
Professor of Law and Director of the Amicus Project, Southwestern Law
School. Supervising Editor of the Journal of International Media and Entertainment Law,
published by the American Bar Association and the Donald E. Biederman Entertainment and
Media Law Institute at Southwestern. The author thanks Natasha Mehlum, a Biederman
Scholar at Southwestern, for her assistance in the preparation of this Article.
1.
No. 13-461, slip op. (U.S. June 25, 2014).
2.
See id. at 8, 12–13, 17–18.
3.
See 47 U.S.C. § 522(13) (2012); Aereo, Inc., No. 13-461, slip. op. at 8,
12–13, 17–18; Greg Sandoval, A Bet That Diller-Backed Aereo TV Startup Wins Its Day in
Court, CNET (June 3, 2012, 4:00 AM), http://www.cnet.com/news/a-bet-that-diller-backedaereo-tv-startup-wins-its-day-in-court/.
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from these MVPDs as a primary source of revenue, in addition to
advertising.4
Broadcasters’ reliance on retransmission fees, however, undermine
the free, over-the-air model of broadcast distribution enshrined in the
Communications Act of 1934, and enforced by the Federal Communications
Commission (“FCC”) through regulation.5 Those fortunate enough to be
granted a broadcast license benefit from what is known as a command-andcontrol spectrum use policy that gives the licensee exclusive control of a
large amount of frequency bandwidth—government bandwidth that is scarce,
valuable, and in high demand by other telecommunications providers.6 This
Article will examine the law and policy issues relating to a significant
reduction—but not an abandonment—of the command-and-control system of
spectrum use by current licensees.7 Simply put, broadcasters would use less
spectrum to receive the same core benefits they have now.8 Indeed,
Congress and the FCC should encourage a spectrum allocation system that
allows for more efficient and localized use of frequency bandwidth by more
users, while preserving public interest set-asides for current network and
affiliate content on non-broadcast MVPDs.
II.

REVISITING THE FCC’S SPECTRUM REALLOCATION DEBATE

In 2002, FCC Chairman Michael Powell convened a Spectrum Task
Force that issued a report analyzing FCC policy regarding spectrum use.9
The mandate of the task force was not only to review the current approaches
to spectrum management, but also to explore alternative models of spectrum
management that would “better promote the most efficient and productive
use of [the] spectrum.”10
In its report, the Spectrum Task Force describes three models of
spectrum use in the United States: command-and-control, exclusive use, and

4.
See Only Seven Percent of TV Households Rely on Over-the-Air Signals,
According to CEA Study, CONSUMER ELECTRONICS ASS’N (July 30, 2013), http://www.ce.org/
News/News-Releases/Press-Releases/2013-Press-Releases/Only-Seven-Percent-of-TVHouseholds-Rely-on-Over-t.aspx; Sandoval, supra note 3.
5.
See Communications Act of 1934, 47 U.S.C. §§ 151–154 (2012);
Sandoval, supra note 3.
6.
FED. COMMC’NS COMM’N SPECTRUM POLICY TASK FORCE, REPORT OF THE
SPECTRUM RIGHTS AND RESPONSIBILITIES WORKING GROUP 2–3, 10–11 (2002).
7.
See infra Part II, III.
8.
See FED. COMMC’NS COMM’N SPECTRUM POLICY TASK FORCE, supra note
6, at 2–3, 17–18.
9.
See id. at 1.
10.
Id.
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open access.11 Command-and-control is the most regulatory intensive of the
models.12 “The traditional process of spectrum management in the United
States,” command-and-control, requires the FCC to “allocate[] and assign[]
frequencies to limited categories of spectrum users for specific governmentdefined uses,” including broadcasting.13 Nearly every aspect of spectrum
use is defined by the FCC, including: user eligibility requirements, “service
restrictions, power limits, build-out requirements”, and infrastructure
specifications, among others.14
One of the great innovations of the Spectrum Task Force Report is
its nod to exclusive use and open access use alternatives, both of which are
more efficient than traditional command-and-control.15 The 2002 Spectrum
Task Force Report describes exclusive use as
[a] licensing model in which a licensee has exclusive and
transferable rights to the use of [a] specified spectrum within a
defined geographic area, with flexible use rights that are governed
primarily by technical rules to protect spectrum users against
interference. Under this model, exclusive rights resemble property
rights in spectrum, but this model does not imply or require
creation of full private property rights in spectrum.16

Many envision a system where broadcast signals could be relayed
like mobile telephony across licensed signal conduits.17 In such a system,
programmers can distribute content without monopolizing a dedicated
frequency in an entire market.18 In effect, this is what many consumers do
when they live stream a retransmitted feed from a broadcast television or
radio station over a 4G or LTE connection to their smartphone or tablet.19
From the consumer’s standpoint, there is no discernible difference in the
11.
12.
13.

Id. at 2.
See id. at 3–5.
FED. COMMC’NS COMM’N SPECTRUM POLICY TASK FORCE, supra note 6, at

2.
14.
Id.
15.
Id. at 17, 19.
16.
Id. at 2.
17.
See Only Seven Percent of TV Households Rely on Over-the-Air Signals,
According to CEA Study, supra note 4.
18.
See WILLIAM LEHR, MASS. INST. OF TECH., TOWARD MORE EFFICIENT
SPECTRUM MANAGEMENT: NEW MODELS FOR PROTECTED SHARED ACCESS 4–5 (2014),
available at http://cfp.mit.edu/publications/CFP_Papers/CFP%20Spectrum%20Sharing%
20Paper%202014.pdf.
19.
See Walter S. Mossberg, 4G or Not 4G: A Guide to Cut Through All the
‘Fast’ Talk, WALL ST. J., Mar. 28, 2012, at D1; Only Seven Percent of TV Households Rely on
Over-the-Air Signals, According to CFA Study, supra note 4.
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reception experience.20 But from a spectrum use standpoint, using a
frequency for program streaming is much more efficient.21 For one, it is
interactive, allowing consumers to choose what programs to stream over it.22
But more importantly, the frequency itself is used more efficiently.23
The least restrictive of the models is open access, also widely
referred to as the commons.24 The commons is kind of like the wild west of
spectrum use.25 As the report describes, the commons model
[a]llows unlimited numbers of unlicensed users to share
frequencies, with usage rights that are governed by technical
standards or etiquettes but with no right to protection from
interference. Spectrum is available to all users that comply with
established technical etiquettes or standards that set power limits
and other criteria for operation of unlicensed devices to mitigate
potential interference.”26

By the turn of the current century, a number of academics, including
Lawrence Lessig, pushed the commons model as a means to make spectrum
use more efficient.27 In his book, The Future of Ideas, Lessig lauds the
commons as a way to free spectrum from the yoke of government control:28
My claim is that there is enough evidence of a different way to
order spectrum that we should be exploring whether spectrum
could be ordered as a commons.
. . . There would be a role for regulation even if spectrum were
free. But this regulation would look very different from the
regulation that now controls spectrum. The government—or the
market—would not be deciding who gets to use the spectrum. The
government would simply be assuring that the technologies that
use the spectrum are properly certified technologies.

20.
See Only Seven Percent of TV Households Rely on Over-the-Air Signals,
According to CFA Study, supra note 4.
21.
See FED. COMMC’NS COMM’N SPECTRUM POLICY TASK FORCE, supra note
6, at 6.
22.
See id.
23.
See id.
24.
Id. at 2.
25.
See id.
26.
FED. COMMC’NS COMM’N SPECTRUM POLICY TASK FORCE, supra note 6, at
2.
27.
See LAWRENCE LESSIG, THE FUTURE OF IDEAS: THE FATE OF THE
COMMONS IN A CONNECTED WORLD 92 (2001).
28.
Id. at 83–84.
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. . . The role of the government . . . would be much less invasive
than under the current regulatory regime.29

Despite its embrace of the alternative spectrum management models
for certain uses, the Spectrum Task Force ultimately concludes that certain
uses of spectrum should continue to be managed under traditional commandand-control.30 Command-and-control, in their view, is important to promote
and enforce public interest objectives:31
With respect to the command-and-control model, . . . the
[Task Force] recognizes that continued use of this approach may
be required in situations where prescribing spectrum use by
regulation is necessary to accomplish compelling public interest
objectives. However, such objectives should be carefully defined,
and the amount of spectrum subject to a command-and-control
should be limited to . . . [that which] ensure[s] that those objectives
are achieved. Many spectrum users will claim that they warrant
special consideration and thus deserve exemption from any reform
of their service allocation rules. It is therefore critical to
distinguish between special interest and the public interest,
establishing a high bar for any service to clear prior to receiving an
exemption.32

The Spectrum Task Force Report concluded in 2002 that commandand-control was, as of then, the best model for broadcasting.33 But they left
open the possibility that the time may come when efficiency considerations
would outweigh public interest mandates.34 “For the time being, broadcast
spectrum should continue to be subject to the command-and-control model
due to the public interest obligations placed on broadcasters and the free
over-the-air nature of broadcast service.”35 In the future, the balance
between efficiency and public interest would need to be reevaluated.36
We further recommend that the Commission fundamentally alter
the existing balance among these models—which is dominated by
29.
30.

Id. at 83.
FED. COMMC’NS COMM’N SPECTRUM POLICY TASK FORCE, supra note 6, at

31.
32.
33.
34.
35.

Id. at 20.
Id. at 20–21.
See id. at 44.
See id.
FED. COMMC’NS COMM’N SPECTRUM POLICY TASK FORCE, supra note 6, at

36.

Id.

20.

44.

Published by NSUWorks, 2017

5

Nova Law Review, Vol. 39, Iss. 3 [2017], Art. 3

330

NOVA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 39

legacy command-and-control regulation—by expanding the use of
both the exclusive use and commons models throughout the radio
spectrum, and limiting the use of the command-and-control model
to those instances where there are compelling public policy reasons
to continue using it.37

In the nearly fifteen years since the Spectrum Task Force published
its report, the need for greater spectrum use efficiency has increased
significantly with the explosion of broadband and mobile telephony.38 At the
same time, the utility of spectrum-based command-and-control broadcasting
has diminished significantly.39 Broadcasters thrive in an age when the vast
majority of American households rely on signal retransmission to receive
broadcast programming through cable or satellite service, or by simply
streaming on demand over a broadband Internet connection.40 Is the current
6 MHz command-and-control allocation really in the public’s interest? Or is
it tantamount to an overly generous give-away of a government benefit to
meet an industry’s special interest? This Article proposes that the time has
come to revisit the balance between efficiency and public interest in the use
of broadcast spectrum.41
III.

REFRAMING THE PUBLIC INTEREST DEBATE

Broadcasters benefit from two government-granted legal
monopolies.42 They enjoy a license—without a government fee—that
entitles them to command and control 6 MHz of radio spectrum in a
specified local market for their private benefit.43 In addition, Congress
created a market for these licenses, worth fifty billion dollars in the
aggregate, by allowing broadcast entities to transfer licenses to third parties
at market rates—and without recoupment of any of that value to the
37.
Id. at 16–17.
38.
See Only Seven Percent of TV Households Rely on Over-the-Air Signals,
According to CEA Study, supra note 4.
39.
See FED. COMMC’NS COMM’N SPECTRUM POLICY TASK FORCE, supra note
6, at 42.
40.
See Only Seven Percent of TV Households Rely on Over-the-Air Signals,
According to CEA Study, supra note 4.
41.
See infra Part IV.
42.
See 47 U.S.C. § 307(c)(1) (2012); Jeffrey A. Eisenach, The Equities and
Economics of Property Interests in TV Spectrum Licenses, NAVIGANT ECON. 6–7 (Jan. 2014),
http://www.nab.org/documents/newsRoom/pdfs/011614_Navigant_spectrum_study.pdf.
43.
47 U.S.C. § 307(a), (c)(1); see also FED. COMMC’NS COMM’N, THE
BROADCAST TELEVISION SPECTRUM INCENTIVE AUCTION: INNOVATION IN POLICY TO IGNITE
INNOVATION FOR CONSUMERS AND BUSINESS, FCC STAFF SUMMARY 3 (2013), available at
https://apps.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/DOC-318455A1.pdf.
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government.44 Broadcasters also keep their licenses in perpetuity, with
largely pro forma renewals every eight years.45 In addition, broadcast
licensees’ stations are universally available to the public, either through
channels mandated for antenna reception on American television sets or, at
the licensee’s election, through compulsory free carriage on pay television
systems in their local area.46 In return for this command-and-control benefit,
licensees are subject to regulations in the public interest, including public
interest requirements for broadcasters, including candidate access, children’s
television programming, indecency, and even no-longer-operable initiatives
like ascertainment and the Fairness Doctrine.47
Broadcasters also benefit from a second government monopoly, a
bundle of exclusive rights set forth in the Copyright Act of 1976.48 The
principal benefit available to licensees under copyright law is the ability to
negotiate—and renegotiate—retransmission consent of its programming with
other pay television MVPDs, like cable and satellite providers.49 These
negotiated retransmission fees stand as a revenue-generating alternative to
the must-carry rules available under the Cable Television Consumer
Protection and Competition Act of 1992 (“Cable Television Act”), which
mandates compulsory carriage of a broadcaster’s signal without a licensing
fee if the broadcaster so elects.50 Until the 1970s, pay television
retransmission consent and negotiated royalty payments were not issues for
broadcast licensees who relied on cable television systems to relay their
signals into communities where topography or interference prevented
spectrum reception.51 These Community Antenna Television systems, as
they were known during this era, were allowed to retransmit the licensees’
signals for free so that broadcasters could more fully realize the benefit of
their command-and-control spectrum allocation.52 Broadcasters essentially

44.
Eisenach, supra note 42, at 6, 11.
45.
47 U.S.C. § 307(c)(1).
46.
See 47 U.S.C. § 534 (2012).
47.
See Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 377–78 (1969).
48.
17 U.S.C. § 106 (2012).
49.
Cable Television Consumer Protection and Competition Act of 1992, Pub.
L. No. 102-385, § 6(2)(b)(1)(A)–(D), 106 Stat. 1460, 1482. Broadcasters also enjoy limited
rights as exclusive licensees of other copyright holders that create television programming. 17
U.S.C. § 106(4)–(5).
50.
See § 4(a), 106 Stat. at 1471; § 6(2)(b)(1)(A)–(D), 106 Stat. at 1482.
51.
STUART MINOR BENJAMIN ET AL., TELECOMMUNICATIONS LAW AND POLICY
385–90 (1st ed. 2001).
52.
Id. at 380.
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did without one government benefit to avail themselves more effectively of
the other.53
By the time of the 1976 Copyright Act, however, the media
landscape had already changed.54 In the 1960s, cable television providers
discovered that customers were willing to pay for original content.55
Dedicated basic cable channels and premium services proliferated, and pay
television became a programming alternative to broadcasting.56 Cable was
no longer Community Antenna Television; it had become a competing
programming source, and a nascent threat to the established hegemony of
broadcasting.57 This threat was addressed in the Copyright Act, in the very
provisions that were before the United States Supreme Court in the Aereo
case in 2014.58 Indeed, the public performance language that expressly
applies copyright protection to the unaltered retransmission of a
broadcaster’s signal legislatively overruled two Supreme Court cases from
the CATV era, Fortnightly Corp. v. United Artists Television, Inc.59 and
Teleprompter Corp. v. Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc.,60 which had
viewed unaltered retransmissions as an exception to the retransmission
consent requirement under the Copyright Act.61
In the four decades since the Copyright Act, broadcast licensees’
reliance on the benefits of retransmission consent has increased significantly,
as pay television became the dominant pipeline into American homes for
television programming.62 Now television broadcasters, and the networks
that own many of the stations, regularly engage in negotiations with cable
television providers in hope of exacting a high market rate fee for
retransmission consent.63 While they take a risk of having the negotiations
fail, and getting blacked out on a local system, the upside has been great for
broadcasters.64 A number of recent instances underscore the importance of

53.

See FED. COMMC’NS COMM’N SPECTRUM POLICY TASK FORCE, supra note

6, at 3–4.
54.
See Sharon Strover, Cable Television: United States, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
TELEVISION 2004, (Museum of Broad Commc’ns, Vol. 1, 2004).
55.
See id.
56.
See id.
57.
See id.
58.
17 U.S.C. §§ 101, 106 (2012); see ABC, Inc. v. Aereo, Inc., No. 13-461,
slip op. at 7–8 (U.S. June 25, 2014).
59.
392 U.S. 390 (1968).
60.
415 U.S. 394 (1974).
61.
17 U.S.C. § 101; Aereo, Inc., No. 13-461, slip op. at 7; see also
Teleprompter Corp., 415 U.S. at 414–15; Fortnightly Corp., 392 U.S. at 400–01.
62.
See Strover, supra note 54.
63.
FED. COMMC’NS COMM’N, supra note 43, at 1.
64.
See id.
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this new revenue source to broadcasters.65 In the 1990s, then Disney chair
Michael Eisner may have threatened to pull Monday Night Football from its
ABC network lineup because he was frustrated over affiliate compensation,
which he considered uneconomic.66 The move of Monday Night Football to
ESPN, became a reality under Bob Iger’s tenure, in 2006.67 A more dramatic
dust-up was created by Chase Carey, COO of News Corporation, in 2013
when he publicly mused about moving the entire Fox Broadcasting Network
to cable.68 The threat was made in response to the perceived threat of Aereo
to upend the retransmission consent fees that Fox had begun to rely upon.69
One is left to wonder if Fox and other networks would have really abandoned
their command-and-control spectrum if Aereo had prevailed in 2014.70
The problem for broadcasters is that these two monopolies are
fundamentally incompatible.71 The more licensees rely on the Copyright Act
for revenue, the less valuable the benefit of command-and-control spectrum
is for them.72 It is an inverse proportion that has been borne out by the failed
promise of digital signal propagation.73
In 2009, the FCC completed a gradual transition from the National
Television System Committee (“NTSC”) standard definition television—the
system that had been in place since 1940—to advanced television signals, a
digital system that was supposed to usher in an era of crystal-clear reception
and high-resolution.74 Unlike its analog counterpart, signals encoded
65.
See, e.g., David S. Cohen, News Corp. Threatens to Make Fox Cable-Only
Amid Aereo Dispute, VARIETY (Apr. 8, 2013, 10:42 AM), http://variety.com/2013/
digital/news/chase-carey-threatens-to-yank-fox-from-broadcast-tv-over-aereo-1200334235/.
66.
See Marc Gunther & Carol Vinzant, Eisner’s Mousetrap Disney’s CEO
Says the Company Has a Lot of Varied Problems He Can Fix. But What If the Real Issue Is
Something He Can’t Face?, FORTUNE (Sept. 6, 1999), http://archive.fortune.com/magazines/
fortune/fortune_archive/1999/09/06/265291/index.htm.
67.
See Bob Raissman & Matt Marrone, ESPN Grabs “Monday Night
Football”, AM. SPORTSCASTERS ONLINE, http://www.americansportscastersonline.com/
mondaynightfootball.html (last visited Aug. 10, 2015); Robert A. Iger: Chairman and Chief
Executive Officer, WALT DISNEY COMPANY, https://thewaltdisneycompany.com/aboutdisney/leadership/ceo/robert-iger (last visited Aug. 10, 2015).
68.
Cohen, supra note 65.
69.
See id.
70.
See ABC, Inc. v. Aereo, Inc., No. 13-461, slip op. at 17–18 (U.S. June 25,
2014); Cohen, supra note 65.
71.
Compare 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2012), with FED. COMMC’NS COMM’N, supra
note 43, at 1, 5.
72.
See 17 U.S.C. § 106; KIMBERLY M. RANDOLPH, STOUT RISIUS ROSS
SPECTRUM
LICENSES:
VALUATION
INTRICACIES
2
(2011),
http://www.srr.com/assets/pdf/spectrum-licenses-valuation-intricacies.pdf.
73.
See FED. COMMC’NS COMM’N, supra note 43, at 5.
74.
James Miller & James E. Preiger, The Broadcasters’ Transition Date
Roulette: Strategic Aspects of the DTV Transition, 9 J. TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 437, 444

Published by NSUWorks, 2017

9

Nova Law Review, Vol. 39, Iss. 3 [2017], Art. 3

334

NOVA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 39

digitally cannot be partially decoded.75 Referred to as the digital cliff effect,
all of a signal must be received or nothing can be decoded.76 The digital cliff
proved to be an obstacle for antenna television households in major cities
and rural areas.77 Reception in metropolitan areas with skyscrapers or
mountains has been spotty since the transition, with large swaths of major
cities like Los Angeles and New York from what the FCC calls the cliff
effect, making antenna service impossible or too expensive.78 Households in
rural areas similarly discovered that digital signals could not reach them.79
Digital signals, as it turns out, have a higher drop-off rate as they travel
longer distances than analog signals, making them unsuitable for homes far
from city transmission towers.80
For some, it may be possible to buy an expensive roof-mounted
antenna that can scan interactively for signals, but the added expense and
technical challenges have not proven worth it for most.81 For apartment
dwellers without access to a rooftop antenna, no amount of money will make
signal reception possible.82 Moreover, unless one subscribed to a pay
television MVPD, homes were required to replace their old equipment with a
new digital television, or a set-top converter box, and a new antenna.83 To
alleviate the cost burden to consumers during the transition, the U.S.
government initiated a coupon program for low-cost or no-cost converter
boxes.84 Pay television subscribers did not have to buy new equipment; they
(2011); Digital Television, FED. COMMC’NS COMM’N, http://www.fcc.gov/digital-television
(last visited Aug. 10, 2015); see also Roy Furchgott, A Downside to Digital TV, N.Y. TIMES,
Apr. 24, 2008, at C6.
75.
See Miller & Preiger, supra note 74, at 448.
76.
Id.
77.
Id.; see also Furchgott, supra note 74.
78.
FED. COMMC’NS COMM’N, FCC 05-199, STUDY OF DIGITAL TELEVISION
FIELD STRENGTH STANDARDS AND TESTING PROCEDURES 25 (2005); see also Furchgott, supra
note 74 (noting digital reception is more easily blocked than analog reception).
79.
See Furchgott, supra note 74.
80.
See Miller & Preiger, supra note 74, at 448; Furchgott, supra note 74; The
COMMC’NS
COMM’N,
Digital
TV
Transition:
Reception
Maps,
FED.
http://transition.fcc.gov/mb/engineering/dtvmaps/ (last visited Aug. 10, 2015).
81.
See Furchgott, supra note 74; The Digital TV Transition: Reception
Maps, supra note 80.
82.
See JONATHAN RINTELS ET AL., LEADERSHIP CONFERENCE ON CIVIL RIGHTS
& LEADERSHIP CONFERENCE ON CIVIL RIGHTS EDUC. FUND, TRANSITION IN TROUBLE: ACTION
NEEDED TO ENSURE A SUCCESSFUL DIGITAL TELEVISION TRANSITION 27–28 (2008) (“These
digital gaps are not confined to sparsely populated rural areas; rather . . . millions of viewers
in New York, Los Angeles, Boston, and other major metro areas will experience digital gaps
in coverage.”).
83.
See id. at 7; Digital Television, supra note 74.
84.
Deficit Reduction Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-171, § 3005(a)–(b), 120
Stat. 4, 23 (2005).
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could continue to use their existing NTSC televisions, did not need an
antenna, and could continue to get a high-quality signal retransmission of
broadcast and transmission of non-broadcast channels.85 In theory, pay
television subscribers would be foregoing high-definition reception, but since
many licensees had opted to multiplex their generous command-and-control
bandwidth into standard definition programming streams, pay MVPD
subscribers with standard definition receivers were not really giving up
much.86
Despite its promise of a new era for broadcasting, the government’s
transition from analog to digital television was a boon for the pay television
industry.87 Households that had once relied on free, over-the-air antenna
television could no longer economically receive a decodable signal in the
digital age.88 Instead of making broadcasters more competitive with pay
television, the move to digital television made broadcasters more reliant
upon it.89
IV.
A.

TOWARD A MORE BALANCED SPECTRUM ALLOCATION POLICY
Preserving Command-and-Control on a Smaller Scale

Efficient spectrum reallocation does not need to abandon commandand-control spectrum use, despite its inherent inefficiency.90 As the 2002
Spectrum Task Force Report points out, command-and-control assures a
variety of spectrum use in the public interest, including satellite access,
emergency services, and, of course, terrestrial broadcasting.91 This Article,
however, proposes a middle ground that is tilted much farther away from the
current command-and-control structure.92 The idea here is to reduce the
spectrum allocation to a bare minimum, enough so that licensees can
transmit by relay to digital receivers to the cord-cutters and cord-nevers,
perhaps using a technology not unlike that employed unsuccessfully by

85.
See RINTELS ET AL., supra note 82, at 28; Only Seven Percent of TV
Households Rely on Over-the-Air Signals, According to CEA Study, supra note 4.
86.
Albert N. Lung, Note, Must-Carry Rules in the Transition to Digital
Television: A Delicate Constitutional Balance, 22 CARDOZO L. REV. 151, 206 (2000).
87.
See Digital Television, supra note 74; Only Seven Percent of TV
Households Rely on Over-the-Air Signals, According to CEA Study, supra note 4.
88.
RINTELS ET AL., supra note 82, at 7.
89.
Id.
90.
See FED. COMMC’NS COMM’N SPECTRUM POLICY TASK FORCE, supra note
6, at 4, 44.
91.
Id. at 20–21.
92.
See infra Part IV.A.

Published by NSUWorks, 2017

11

Nova Law Review, Vol. 39, Iss. 3 [2017], Art. 3

336

NOVA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 39

Aereo.93 How much spectrum is needed may be an open question, but this
would be a significant reduction in the bandwidth currently provided by
government.94 Signal power may also be an issue.95 If broadcasting is
integrated into the existing infrastructure of cell towers and hot spots, it may
be that the stations can operate at low power with little or no interference.96
The quality of revamped antenna television reception may be a concern for
licensees and broadcast networks, however.97 Broadcasters do not want it to
be too good; otherwise, they would not be able to command high
retransmission consent fees from pay television MVPDs.98 One way to
address this may be to allow broadcasters to enhance the signal to the
MVPD, allowing for a richer, or possibly even high-definition primary video
and audio signal for the cable or satellite provider’s paying customers.99
This would likely require action by Congress, but it would give broadcasters
and pay television what they want most.100 A premium tier broadcast service
would look and sound better than what would be available via antenna.101
To be clear, this is a policy that the FCC has been tentatively testing
with its voluntary spectrum buy-back plan for broadcasters, as set forth in the
Agency’s 2010 Spectrum Task Force Report.102 So far, the buy-back has not
freed up a lot spectrum, which the FCC acknowledges it needs to expand
broadband and mobile telephony to underserved communities.103
Broadcasters do not want to give up the scarce resource of spectrum, which
93.

ABC, Inc. v. Aereo, Inc., No. 13-461, slip op. at 14–15, 17 (U.S. June 25,

2014).
94.
See FED COMMC’NS COMM’N SPECTRUM POLICY TASK FORCE, supra note
6, at 26, 30.
95.
See id. at 46.
96.
See id. at 14.
97.
See Michael M. Epstein, “Primary Video” and Its Secondary Effects on
Digital Broadcasting: Cable Carriage of Multiplexed Signals Under the 1992 Cable Act and
the First Amendment, 87 MARQ. L. REV. 525, 543 (2004).
98.
See id. at 542–43; Sandoval, supra note 3.
99.
See Epstein, supra note 97, at 529, 543. More revolutionary transmission
technologies like Visible Light Communications—also known as Li-Fi—could be utilized
similarly in the service of broadcasters. See Joao MM Santos et al., Hybrid GaN LED with
Capillary-Bonded II–VI MQW Color-Converting Membrane for Visible Light
Communications,
SEMICONDUCTOR
SCI.
&
TECH.,
March
2015,
at
1,
http://iopscience.iop.org/0268-1242/30/3/035012/pdf/0268-1242_30_3_035012.pdf.
100.
See Communications Act of 1934, 47 U.S.C. § 301 (2012).
101.
See Digital Television, supra note 74.
102.
Cecilia Kang, FCC to Offer Plan for TV Airwaves Auction, WASH. POST,
Sept. 7, 2012, at A26; see also FED. COMMC’NS COMM’N, MOBILE BROADBAND: THE BENEFITS
OF ADDITIONAL SPECTRUM 4 (2010).
103.
FED. COMMC’NS COMM’N, supra note 102, at 4–5; see also Amy Gahran,
FCC Warns of Looming Mobile Spectrum Crunch, CNN (Nov. 5, 2010, 5:14 PM),
http://www.cnn.com/2010/TECH/mobile/11/05/gahran.mobile.spectrum.crunch/.
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because of third-party resale has great value.104 But, in the Spectrum
Reduction Plan proposed here, the return of spectrum—and bandwidth—
would be mandatory regulation.105 By making it mandatory, the FCC can
help broadcasters understand what they apparently are unable to see: A
generous spectrum bandwidth allocation is not significant to the principal
benefit they receive as terrestrial broadcasters.106 In that sense, this proposal
takes existing FCC spectrum policy to the next level.107
To make this work, the FCC would need to reallocate de minimus
bandwidth to primary audio and video signal, as defined under the Cable
Television Act.108 Weak broadcasters—the ones that Turner Broadcasting
System, Inc. v. FCC109 recognized was in Congress’ purview to help
economically with the must-carry rules—could still take advantage of cable
distribution without payment—essentially the status quo benefit of
broadcasting without the inefficient use of a government resource.110 Strong
stations have demonstrated that they do not need this benefit of spectrum
monopoly, but they would still be able to use the de minimus spectrum.111
And they could still choose compulsory free carriage under current law.112
Put differently, a broadcaster gets almost all the benefits of
command and control—and the monopoly market power that comes with
it—by reducing spectrum bandwidth subject to monopoly license to a much
lower minimum.113 It is more responsive to a market reality in which
broadcasters have effectively abandoned their government monopoly in
exchange for free, over-the-air television.114 Ultimately, the real benefits of
spectrum for broadcasters are the bundle of intellectual property rights that
they have been able to monetize.115 Apart from licensing rights, the principal
benefit of the federal regulatory system today is the capability of
broadcasters to choose universal service, which most broadcasters do not
choose to avail themselves of.116
104.
105.
106.
6, at 47–48.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
6, at 42.
115.
116.
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Legislative and Broadcast Industry Opposition

Incumbent licensees might try to argue that a reduction in spectrum
allocation amounts to a taking of their property by the government.117 The
Communications Act of 1934, however, expressly disclaims any property
interest in their licenses.118 They may also argue that they have invested
heavily in the infrastructure and technology of broadcasting.119 Moreover,
this is not about revoking licenses, although Congress theoretically can do
this without cause.120 Indeed, even if broadcasters can argue that they have
some kind of property right to a government benefit, the critical aspects of
that benefit would not be lost in a Spectrum Reduction Plan.121 First
Amendment challenges would likely fail.122 Even if Red Lion Broadcasting
Co. v. Federal Communications Commission’s123 vision of the public’s
paramount interest does not survive a challenge, it is easy to characterize
spectrum reduction as content neutral, allowing for a good deal of deference
to Congress.124 There is also no reason to think that the FCC would run afoul
of Chevron deference to its agency discretion.
One might fully expect broadcasters and their lobbyists to express
opposition to spectrum reduction.125 For one, when there is a proposed
reduction in a government benefit, the recipients of that benefit will oppose
it.126 But the critical question should be whether the public interest is being
disserved by spectrum bandwidth reduction. Indeed, the spectrum-reduced
regime permits licensees to enjoy retransmission consent rights under the
Copyright Act or compulsory carriage under Cable Television Act.127
Without generous bandwidth, broadcasters would lose the ability to
broadcast to antenna televisions in high definition.128 While the public has
an interest in high definition broadcasting, the reality is that broadcasters
split their bandwidth into lower definition programming streams instead of
using their full bandwidth for high-resolution programming.129 This signal
117.
See U.S. CONST. amend. V.; Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City,
438 U.S. 104, 130 (1978).
118.
Communications Act of 1934, 47 U.S.C. § 301 (2012).
119.
See Penn Cent. Transp. Co., 438 U.S. at 110, 121–22.
120.
See Red Lion Broad Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 388–89 (1969).
See Penn Cent. Transp. Co., 438 U.S. at 121.
121.
122.
See id. at 133–34; Red Lion Broad Co., 395 U.S. at 389.
123.
395 U.S. 367 (1969).
124.
See id. at 390, 399–400; Lung, supra note 86, at 172.
125.
See Red Lion Broad Co., 395 U.S. at 388–89.
126.
See id. at 388–89, 400.
127.
See 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2012); Cable Television Consumer Protection Act of
1992, Pub. L. No. 102-385, § 4 106 Stat. 1460, 1471 (1992).
128.
See Lung, supra note 86, at 206.
129.
See id.

https://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol39/iss3/3

14

M.: Reclaiming The Promise Of Free Local Broadcasting: Spectrum Reall

2015] RECLAIMING THE PROMISE OF FREE LOCAL BROADCASTING

339

multiplexing has become a significant source of additional revenue for
broadcasters, but it was not part of the public interest benefit that Congress
legislated when it mandated a transition to HDTV.130 Indeed, it runs counter
to this benefit.131 In addition, whether a broadcaster transmits in HDTV is
immaterial to cable and satellite customers whose box or televisions are not
HDTV capable.132 Pay television subscribers, as discussed previously, could
benefit from an enhance signal from broadcasters, as long as their tuner and
television are HD capable.133
Pay television MVPDs might mount a challenge to new regulations
requiring set-asides for broadcast stations on their systems.134 There would
be little possibility of success in the courts, however, as the issue was settled
by the Supreme Court of the United States in Turner.135 Indeed, the
implementation of a Spectrum Reduction Plan need not require a revamping
of the must-carry rules currently in place.136 The change would be in the
amount of spectrum that would be subject to the must-carry rules, the
“primary audio and video signal.”137 From a cable or satellite provider’s
standpoint, the burden is no different than it was before—it may even be less
since unenhanced bandwidth would take up less of the subscriber’s
broadband pipeline into the home. Retransmission of an enhanced signal
would be subject to negotiation and agreement with a broadcaster; a pay
MVPD’s use of a licensee’s HDTV signal, for example, would be
determined by the market, not by government regulation.138
IV.

CONCLUSION

This Article does not propose a specific action plan; the idea here is
to introduce a balance that preserves the principal rights and benefits of
broadcasters in a way that makes much more efficient use of spectrum.
Spectrum is much more valuable to the public interest if it is used for mobile

130.
131.
132.

See Epstein, supra note 97, at 557, 568.
See id.
See FED. COMMC’NS COMM’N SPECTRUM POLICY TASK FORCE, supra note

6, at 43.
133.
See supra notes 83, 85 and accompanying text.
134.
See supra Part III.
135.
TBS v. FCC, 520 U.S. 180, 189–90 (1997).
See id. at 185, 189–90; Epstein, supra note 97, at 536–37.
136.
137.
See Epstein, supra note 97, at 536–37.
138.
47 U.S.C. §§ 325(b)(1)(A), 535(g)(1) (2012); see also Eisenach, supra
note 42, at 8, 10–11.
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telephony and new wireless broadband technologies.139 Even with a de
minimus spectrum allocation, licensees still get a great deal from the
government.140 They can continue to enjoy universal service and the mustcarry rules; they can also continue to benefit from a revenue stream under the
Copyright Act.141 The government would also come out ahead here, since
much of that freed up spectrum would be auctioned. Mobile carriers and
internet service providers are willing to pay the government top dollar for a
slice of the radio frequency spectrum pie.142
A Spectrum Reduction Plan may also be a net gain for MVPD
carriers since they could benefit from freed-up spectrum. Ultimately, there
should be no additional burden for pay television providers. The burden
analysis under Turner’s application of the O’Brien test will be the same for
pay television providers.143 Presumably, the same broadcasters who
currently elect compulsory free carriage under the must-carry rules would
continue to elect compulsory carriage. It may even be less of a burden for
pay television MVPDs since broadcasters’ reduced bandwidth would take up
less space in the cable or satellite pipeline.
Could broadcasters be happy with a mandatory Spectrum Reduction
Plan? Well, that remains to be seen. At the end of the day, licensees would
not lose much. To the extent that de minimus spectrum allocation is
incompatible with HDTV transmission, broadcasters can include that in
enhanced signal negotiations—at market rates—with pay television
providers. The small percentage of homes that currently receive antenna
signals would lose high-definition capability, but since licensees multiplex
their signals into standard definition programming streams, they are not
really losing high-resolution reception.144 Licensees may chafe with the
continuation of the public interest regulations that attached to their use of
spectrum—but industry challenges of scarcity and public trustee
justifications for broadcast regulations are not new.145 Indeed, one of the
benefits to the public of a Spectrum Reduction Plan is that it does not change
the scarcity and fiduciary calculus. The spectrum is still scarce, and it is still
139.
See FED. COMMC’NS COMM’N SPECTRUM POLICY TASK FORCE, supra note
6, at 20–21; Only Seven Percent of TV Households Rely on Over-the-Air Signals, According to
CEA Study, supra note 4.
140.
See Evolution of Cable Television, FED. COMMC’NS COMM’N,
http://www.fcc.gov/encyclopedia/evolution-cable-television (last updated Mar. 14, 2012).
141.
17 U.S.C. § 106; TBS, 520 U.S. at 185, 189–90.
142.
See FED. COMMC’NS COMM’N, supra note 43, at 1, 2.
143.
See TBS, 520 U.S. at 185, 189–90.
144.
Lung, supra note 86, at 205–06; Only Seven Percent of TV Households
Rely on Over-the-Air Signals, According to CEA Study, supra note 4.
145.
See FED. COMMC’NS COMM’N, supra note 43, at 1–2; Lung, supra note 86,
at 205–06.
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administered by the government as a public trust.146 Licensees are simply
using less of it.147
In the wake of their victory in Aereo, incumbent broadcasters have
no need to make good on threats to migrate to subscription-based MVPDs
such as Netflix or Comcast.148 They enjoy the best of two monopolies:
Command-and-control over spectrum, and the exclusive rights of the
Copyright Act.149 But they do not need a generous spectrum allocation today
to run a profitable business. If the right balance is struck, broadcasters, pay
television MVPDs, broadband companies, phone carriers, and the
government could all benefit from a Spectrum Reduction Plan. And, perhaps
most importantly, the public would also benefit, since spectrum reduction to
broadcasters means more spectrum is available for the public benefit
elsewhere, and broadcasters would still need to operate in the “‘public
interest, convenience, and necessity.’”150
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See FED. COMMC’NS COMM’N, supra note 43, at 1–2.
147.
See id.
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See ABC, Inc. v. Aereo, Inc., No. 13-461, slip op. at 17–18 (U.S. June 25,
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